The patterns of innovation diffusion are well approximated by the logistic curves. This is the robust empirical fact confirmed by many studies in innovations dynamics. Here, we show that the logistic pattern of innovation diffusion can be replicated by the time-dependent stochastic process with positive feedbacks along the diffusion trajectory. The dynamic increasing returns process is modelled by Polya Urns. So far, Urn models have been mostly used to study the [path-dependent] limit properties. On the contrary, this work focuses on the transient [finite time] properties studying the conditions under which urn models capture the logistic trajectories which often track empirical diffusion process. As examples, we calibrate the process to match several cases of diffusion of motor ships in European countries.
Introduction
The logistic pattern of innovation diffusion is one of the most robust empirical regularities in the literature on adoptions of new technologies. Usually firms or consumers adopt new product sequentially, and the vast majority of eventual users adopt well after the early introduction of a new product. So the diffusion process takes off rather slowly, then, after a while, it accelerates and finally, it slows down until a proximate saturation level is approached. Most empirical studies have shown that observed diffusion patterns are well approximated by logistic curves. This empirical regularity holds for intra-firm, intraindustry, economy-wide adoptions and both for production processes and new products: within a large literature see the early examples from Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1961) , all the way to Comin, Hobijn, and Rovito (2006) and Nuvolari, Verspagen, and Von Tunzelmann (2011) . However, the precise form of logistic diffusion pattern varies considerably across technologies. Moreover, some technologies do not take off at all.
The fundamental interpretative question concerns the determinants of particular diffusion paths. Not surprisingly, the economic discipline has produced different and partly conflicting theoretical explanations (for overviews see Davies 1979; Dosi 2000; Stoneman and Battisti 2010; Cantner and Vannuccini 2017) . There are many divides in the proposed interpretations of time-consuming diffusion processes which relate essentially to (i) the degrees of heterogeneity of potential adopters, (ii) their 'rationality', (iii) the nature of noted by Witt (1997) , that is the implicit assumption that the two technologies, previously nonexistent, are introduced simultaneously into a market. However, usually, we have empirical data on a new technology entering a market of existing technology, i.e. technological newcomer faces an incumbent technology. 2 In the example, which follows, of motor ships diffusion, steam ships were dominating the market at the moment when the internal combustion engine for ships was introduced. To overcome 'the virgin market condition', we follow Witt (1997) and modify the urn model adding the assumption that people do not make decisions on adoption once and forever, but repeatedly, and they may reconsider their decisions along the history. In particular, agents who are already using one technology may discard it. This is modelled via withdrawals from the urn, and this allows us to obtain [as a probabilistic outcome] also a 'lock-in' into a new technology starting from complete market dominance of the old technology. We consider a Polya Urn with two types of processes, additions to the urn and withdrawals from the urn. The former captures technology adoption and the latter -scrap of the incumbent equipment. The combination of the two, as we'll show, allows S-shape pattern to emerge.
Although we deal with time-discrete stochastic process and thus cannot obtain logistic curve as close form solution of our model, 3 we approximate the results with the logistic equation using OLS, and we estimate the goodness-of-fit of our model simulations to empirical curves of motor ships diffusion. We adhere to the minimal number of assumptions to be made, so that all data required for model simulation can be taken from empirical data. To match patterns produced by the Polya processes to annual empirical data on technology market share, we require some correspondence between 'urn time' and 'real time'. To do so we take the empirical dynamics of fleet-stock of a country (how many ships are registered in a country in a given year) and translate this dynamics into additions and withdrawals to/from an urn. In this way, several additions/withdrawals, i.e. steps with which an urn evolves, correspond to a year, i.e. real-time at which technology market share is measured empirically.
In the next section, we describe possible drivers of increasing returns. In Section 3, we present the Polya Urn model, describe the empirical data and calibrate the model to the data. Section 4 presents the simulation results and some robustness checks with respect to model assumptions. Section 5 concludes.
Increasing returns and the diffusion of motor ships
Let us consider the relationship between evolutionary success, intrinsic 'fitness' and chance (i.e. unpredictable historical events) in the development and diffusion of an equipment embodying technology. Students of technical advance long have noted that, in the early stages of a technology history, there usually are a number of competing variants or even competing paradigms. This was also the case of vehicles and watercraft, some driven by the combustion engines and some by steam engines.
As we know, gasoline-fuelled engines came to dominate and steam engine was mostly abandoned. The standard interpretation for this is that gasoline engines were potentially superior and with time, trial-and-error and learning such superiority became manifest. There is however an alternative explanation grounded in the interaction between dynamic increasing returns of some kind, network externalities and path dependency (cf. David 1985 David , 1989 David , 2001 Arthur 1988 Arthur , 1989 . In this second interpretation, the internal combustion engine need not have been innately superior. All that would have been required was that, because of a run of luck, it became heavily used or bought, and this started a rolling snowball mechanism fuelled by some sort of collective positive feedback.
What might be behind an increasing returns rolling snowball? The explanation stresses systems aspects where a particular product has a specialised complementary product or service, whose development lends that variant special advantages. For example, the ascendancy of cars powered by internal combustion engines made it profitable for petroleum companies to locate petroleum stations at convenient places. It also made it profitable for them to search for more sources of petroleum, and to develop technologies that reduced petroleum production costs. This applies to ships, too, increasing the attractiveness of diesel powered ships to ship transportation companies. 4,5 Arthur (1989) argues that as late as 1914 steam was at least as viable as crude oil for powering vehicles -but the growing influence of the oil industry ensured that much more money went into improving the internal combustion engine than the steam engine. That, plus 'small events' (the outbreak of hoof and mouth disease among horses used to refill steam boilers (Cowan 1990) ) induced a snowball effect in favour of internal combustion engines.
Complementary dynamic increasing returns and network externalities can explain also why 'older' technologies resist so long before being completely abandoned. If what different users buy are similar, or compatible, may lend advantage to a variant that just happened to attract a number of customers already. As steam was initially dominating the market, network externalities were high. People who learned to steer steam ships naturally were attracted to them, since they knew how they worked. Spare parts were abundant and so were repair services. Thus, many users preferred persistently the steam technology. 4 Internal combustion engines were fuelled with diesel that had higher thermal efficiency. It enabled ships to travel faster and cover greater distances; it yielded 50% greater mileage than an equivalent quantity of coal (the fuel of steam ships). Moreover, with diesel a ship could be refuelled while underway, whereas the loading of coal required a ship to stop in ports equipped with the necessary facilities. Finally, diesel was far simpler to store and move once on board than coal, and required less space and fewer men, considering that on coal/steam ships, a full three-quarters of the crew was generally devoted to moving coal and controlling related machines (Maugeri 2006 Commercially, the advantages of motor ship are very great. Boats driven by Diesel motors save 75% on space needed to carry fuel, this way more space is made available for cargo, with appreciable effect on the earning power of the ship. The fuel bill of a motor ship is small compared with that of a steamship: a motor ship of average size will consume 15 tons of fuel a day, where an oil-burning steamer would need 30 tons. A motor ship can carry 20% more cargo than a steamship of the same size, because a vast amount of space in the engine room of a steamship is taken up by boilers, which are not needed by the motor ship. Water-ballast tanks, holding a non-paying element on the steamship, are absent from the motor ship. (Wilkins 1925) Additionally, as Edwin Mansfield notes in his seminal contribution (Mansfield 1961) , when the innovation replaces equipment that is durable, adopters are reluctant to scrap ahead of time the equipment embodying the old technology. In such cases, there is a good chance that a firm's old equipment still has a relatively long useful life.
The model

Polya Urn stochastic process
Polya Urns formalise non-stationary Markov chains with a growing number of states. In the context of technologies diffusion, the stochastic process concerns market share of a particular technology, x t . It lives on a one-dimensional simplex (0,1), capturing the shares of, for simplicity, two technologies. For our purposes here let us consider two types of urn schemes, namely, additions to the urn (Hill, Lane, and Sudderth 1980; Kaniovski 1986, 1987; Kaniovski and Pflug 1995) and withdrawals from the urn (Siegrist 1987; Kuba and Panholzer 2012; Panholzer and Kuba 2012) .
Additions to the urn
Consider an urn of infinite capacity with balls of two types, A and B. For us, A and B will represent two competing technologies. x k is the share of A-balls in the urn at the step k. Starting with n A ≥ 1 A-balls and n B ≥ 1 B-balls in the urn, a ball is added at steps k = 1, 2, . . ., i.e. a new adopter chooses one of the two technologies. It will be A with the probability p(x) and B with the probability 1 − p(x). The corresponding random variable is ξ(x k ) has Bernoulli distribution:
The probability function p(x) maps the share of A-balls in the urn into the probability of its adoption, i.e. R (0, 1) into R [0, 1] (e.g. Figure 1 ). Depending on the form of the probability function p(x) the urn-process will exhibit different dynamics over time, formally given by the relation:
, and note that E(λ(x k )) = 0. Then, (2) can be rewritten as
The system (3) shifts on average at each step k ≥ 1 on the value
Consequently, limit states of the sequences {x k } have to belong to the set of zeros of the function p(
given that e 1 ≤ |x − θ| ≤ e 2 for x ∈ [0, 1]. The set of stable limit states of the urn process depends on the form of the probability function p(x). And the convergence rate to θ ∈ depends upon the smoothness of p(x). Limit properties of the process have been extensively studied in Hill, Lane, and Sudderth (1980) , Arthur, Ermoliev, and Kaniovski (1986) , Kaniovski and Pflug (1995) and .
Withdrawals from the urn
Consider the foregoing urn with balls of two types, A and B, n A ≥ 1 and n B ≥ 1 and with x k being the share of A-balls in the urn at the step k. A ball is removed from the urn at steps k = 1, 2, . . .. For us it will represent the scraping of old equipment by users. The instrument item embodying technology A will be scrapped with probability 1 − p(x k ) and the item embodying technology B -with probability p(x k ). The corresponding random variable ε(x k ) has Bernoulli distribution:
Note the reciprocity of Bernoulli distributions for the case of adoption of the technology A, ξ(x k ) (1) and for the case of abolishment of the technology A, ε(x k ) (4).
The dynamics in time is given by the same type of the relation as in (2) but with the opposite sign in front of ε(x i ) and k because balls are removed from the urn:
For simplicity, we assume that both processes, additions to the urn and withdrawals from the urn, have the same probability function p(x). We choose p(x) such that it increases the probability of the adoption of technology that has the biggest share in the urn at the time of the adoption, and symmetrically of the scrapping of technology that has the smaller share.
In the following, we study the property of such an increasing returns world. The urn process with the probability function p(x) that embodies increasing returns 6 has a 'lockin' into monopoly as the stable limit state. Stable limit states are only 1 and 0, which correspond to the monopoly of the technology A or the technology B respectively.
As an illustration of a possible dynamic mechanism, suppose that potential adopters are only imperfectly informed about the potential of two technologies (A and B) available. So they make their choices by asking an odd number s of adopters who have already adopted one of the two technologies and they adopt the technology that the majority of their sample is using. An alternative hypothesis leading to the same effect is that there are positive externalities in adoption which change the returns to the user along the diffusion process, and adopters are influenced by different numbers of users. 7 Hence, the probability 6 Urn processes with the probability function p(x) that embodies increasing returns are, in fact, time-dependent stochastic processes with positive feedback. 7 Such behaviour is sometimes referred to as 'herd' behaviour or information cascades. It happens that it might be optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behaviour of the preceding individual without regard to his own information (see Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992; De Vany and Walls 1996; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1998 , and others for models of information cascades). 
where C i s is the number of i-combinations from s. For example, suppose s = 3. So one samples 3 balls from the urn. If 2 of the balls are A-balls, in the process additions to the urn, one will add one more A-ball to the urn; while in the process withdrawals from the urn, one will remove one B-ball from the urn. prove that the probability function (6) exhibits increasing returns [the probability of adoption increases with the share of the technology, x t ] and leads to the 'lock-in' into monopoly. The probability function (6) is plotted on Figure 1 . As can be seen, technologies have equal chances to be selected as the winning technology by the time-dependent process -an asymptotic property of such urn model setup that was widely exploited in evolutionary economics.
To bring Polya Urn process to the empirical data, we need to formalise two further elements: the first is the correspondence between real time [measured in years t = 1, 2, . . .] and steps with which the urn process evolves k = 1, 2, . . ., and the second is the correspondence between the urn share of the technology and its market share. The first correspondence involves the assumption that within one calendar year several balls can be added/withdrawn from the urn. Suppose n t additions to the urn and m t withdrawals from the urn happen in year t. X t is the share of A-balls in the urn in year t, and, analogously to (2) and (5), its dynamics can be formalised as:
Figure 3 presents an example of realisations of the process (7), and, as can be seen, simulated patterns tend to display logistic shape. The second correspondence is between the urn share of the technology and its market share. It is needed to overcome 'the virgin market condition' implicit in classical Polya Urn model that maps the urn share directly into technology market share. Here, we distinguish the urn share of the technology and its market share. In turn, this allows to start the process from any market share, including complete absence of one of the technologies, which was initially the case of motor ships. We assume that Urn process models the behaviour of new adopters. 8 The market share of the technology, denote it X t , in turn, evolves from the initial share of the technology and is fully governed by the behaviour of new adopters, i.e. by the urn process.
We say that X t specified in (7) captures the behaviour of new adopters, and that the market share of the technology -X t , in turn, is specified as
, for k ≥ 1 and
, and X 1 = 0.5, (A and B) . The number of balls to be added each year is an arithmetical progression with n 1 = 10 and step 10. The number of balls to be withdrawn each year is an arithmetical progression with m 1 = 1 and step 1. Only realisations that converged to stable limit states in 40 years time period are plotted. Dotted lines are averages across realisations that converged to one of the two possible stable limit states.
where n A and n B are initial numbers of motor ships and steam ships in the fleet of a country. In the particular case of X 1 = 0.5 Urn process starts with the equal probability for each technology to be adopted p(X 1 ) = 50% (i.e. the share of possible new adopters that have adopted a motor ship equals to the share of new adopters that have adopted a steam ship). Further, the process develops according to the probability function (6) entailing positive feedback to adoption.
In the Section 3.3, we calibrate the Urn process (8) to fit our empirical data and in the results section, we perform robustness check with respect to the X 1 = 0.5 condition by gradually increasing new adopters preference for motor ships.
The data
We have historical time series data on the adoption of motor ships, i.e. ships propelled by an internal combustion engine, usually a diesel engine, in several European countries. Annual time series on the number of motor ships in the merchant fleet and the total size of the merchant fleet is taken from Mitchell (1998) . 9 For the calibration of our model, we will use the data of five countries: Belgium, Finland, Spain, Norway and Denmark, for which the time series are most complete (Figure 4) . The completeness of time-series data, i.e. the presence of observations at the beginning and at the end of the diffusion process is essential for accurate estimation of the logistic curve (see Comin, Hobijn, and Rovito 2008, for the discussion of inaccurate predictions when the data are incomplete). In addition, our model requires the availability of complete annual data on the total market size (i.e. countries fleet stock).
Two first diesel-powered ships were launched in 1903, both for river and canal operations: 'La Petite-Pierre' in France, powered by Dyckhoff-built diesels, and 'Vandal' tanker in Russia, powered by Swedish-built diesels with an electrical transmission. In 1910 the Norwegian built 'Fram' -the sailing ship fitted with an auxiliary diesel engine, the first ocean-going ship with a diesel engine. And in 1912 the Danish built the first ocean-going ship exclusively powered by a diesel engine, MS Se-landia (Stapersma 1996) , thus making Norway and Denmark leaders in the adoption of motor ships.
It was only after World War One that Diesel's invention began to slowly realise its commercial potential. And by 1939 only a quarter of global sea trade was fuelled by diesel. Even if a motor engine was improved enough to become a superior technology in comparison with a steam engine, the adoption of it didn't happen immediately. Figure 4 shows the diffusion of motor ships in five European countries. As can be seen from this figure, it took between 18 (in Norway) and 8 (in Finland) years for a motor technology to arrive from 25% of the market share to 50%.
Calibration of the stochastic process
Let us start with the assumption that initial chances of adoption of one of the technologies, motor or steam, were equal. 10 This is not too unplausible assumption to make. As we argued above, there could have been many reasons why firms were reluctant to adopt the motor technology even if it represented a potential cost saving opportunity, from the purchase price advantage and the incumbent experience in mastering the old technology that may well account for the persist preference for the old technology. So, when buying new ship, an adopter had to choose between the old and the new technology balancing advantages and disadvantages of the two, influenced also by its incumbent capabilities, the observation of its competitors, the availability of supporting infrastructures, etc. In terms of the Polya Urn process, each simulation starts with the equal probability for each technology to be adopted p(X 1 ) = 50% (i.e. the share of possible new adopters that have adopted a motor ship equals to the share of new adopters that have adopted a steam ship). Further, the process develops according to the probability function (6) entailing positive feedback to adoption.
The number of balls in the urn corresponds to the size of the merchant fleet in a given year T. We assume that a ship is scrapped after 30 years of its exploitation. So every year we scrap 1/30 ≈ 3% of the initial fleet stock. In terms of the Polya Urn process, every year we remove the number of balls corresponding to the number of ships to be scrapped in that year, we add the same number of new balls and we additionally add(remove) the number of balls corresponding to the difference in fleet stock between year T and T + 1. In this way, the urn always matches the empirical data on the size of the merchant fleet in a given year, and we do not need to make any additional assumptions to generate n t and m t time-series for our model (see Equation (7) and Figure 5(b) ). Figure 5(a) shows the Urns' cumulative growth rates for the five countries in our data-set. We see that in Belgium and Finland the size of the fleet, i.e. the urn, decreased by 40% over the years in comparison with its initial size. In Spain, Norway and Denmark, the fleet size grew by 200%, 100% and 30%, respectively. Fleet size of a country and its dynamics affect the speed of diffusion. For example, the fleet of Belgium is 22 times smaller than the one of Norway. This contributes to explain why it took Belgium only 10 years to arrive from 25% of the market share to 50%, and it took Norway -18 years to do the same.
We keep track of the proportion of motor ships among new adoptions. This is our urn process described in Equation (7). At the same time, we keep track of the proportion of motor ships in the fleet of a country X T , Equation (8), which changes every year lead by the decisions taken by new adopters in the given year. This process fully depends on the underlining urn process, and it mimics the historical time series.
Results
We show that the proportion of motor ships in the fleet of a country, X T , tracks empirical time series on the market share of motor ships in a given country. We perform 100 simulations for each country. In around half of the simulations, the process leads to the market superiority of motor ships. On the Figure 6 we plot the average value and the dispersion of the market share across simulations 11 in a given year together with historical times series. To test whether the simulated pattern is statistically different from the historical diffusion path, we fitted the logistic curve to the historical data and to the simulated data for each country and conducted z-test of statistical significance of the difference between the values of the regression coefficients of two logistic curves 11 We consider only simulations that led to the market superiority of motor ships. (Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou 1995; Paternoster et al. 1998) . 12 We did not find significant differences in all five countries.
12 Logistic curve Y t = 1 1+e −(a+b·t) (where the ceiling is assumed to be 1 -monopoly of one of the technologies) can be linearly transformed into equation log( (Griliches 1957) , allowing us to estimate the coefficient b directly by least squares. a positions the curve on the time scale and b is the adoption speed. We estimate the latter equation on historical and simulated data assuming equal position of curves on the time scale and obtaining the coefficients of adoption speed b empirical and b simulations , respectively. We test their equivalence using z-statistics,
, where SE is standard error. z-statistics follows a standard unit normal distribution under the null hypothesis of equality of the two coefficients (Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou 1995; Paternoster et al. 1998 ). We do not reject the null hypothesis of equality if p-values are bigger than 0.05 associated with a 95% confidence level, which means that z-statistics falls between −1.96 and +1.96. 
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Only simulations that converged to the final empirical market share ±20% are considered. The percentage of such simulations is indicated by the colour of boxes. This percentage grows when we increase initial strength of new adopters preference for motor ships, p(X 1 ). When p(X 1 ) = 50% these percentages are the following: Belgium 25%, Denmark 23%, Finland 17%, Norway 15%, Spain 23% (One should keep in mind that only 50% of simulations lead to market superiority of motor ships. So, for example, for Belgium half of these simulations reached final empirical market share). Each box gives the distribution for a particular value of p(X 1 ). The distribution is displayed in the form of a boxplot (the central rectangle spans the first quartile to the third quartile of the distribution. A segment inside the rectangle shows the median and 'whiskers' above and below the box show the locations of the minimum and maximum. Individual outliers are displayed as points).
Robustness checks
Next, we assess the effect of initial (at t = 1) strength of new adopters preference for motor ships, p(X 1 ), on the distance between simulated and empirical diffusion curves. The larger becomes the deviation of the simulated diffusion pattern from the historical one, the worse is the performance of our model. The distance is defined as the sum over all years of absolute values of deviations of simulated curve from the historical one. There is considerable increase in this distance when we increase initial strength of new adopters' preference for motor ships for Norway and Denmark (Figure 7) . For Belgium and Finland the impact of p(X 1 ) increase is negligible. Historically, Norway and Denmark were the first countries in our sample to start adoptions of motor ships (Figure 4) . Twenty-five per cent market shares of motor ships was reached before 1920ies in these two countries, while in Belgium it happened more than 20 years later and in Finland more than 30 years later. We can speculate that at the beginning of the diffusion actual adopters were indifferent between the two technologies, i.e. p(X 1 ) = 0.5, as it provides the best fit for early adopting countries like Norway and Denmark. In general, from this exercise, we might conjecture that initial strength of new adopters' preference for one of technologies should be calibrated not on the ground of the proportions in the stock of one country but in the world (Pulkki-Brännström and Stoneman 2013). 13 Especially, if one deals with global transportation technologies dependent on infrastructure available not only at home but in the area of operation, international spillovers can be high.
At the same time the number of simulations that reached the final empirical market share ±20% in a given historical time period increases when we increase initial strength of new adopters preference for motor ships ( Figure 7 , the colour of boxes). By augmenting the chances of motor ships to be a winning technology we increase chances of simulations to reach the final empirical market share in period that matches the historical one. We do not know what were the real chances, whether at the beginning of the story the winning of motor ships was the event of high or low probability. However, our simulation suggests that they were quite high.
Conclusion
Evolutionary models of technical change and diffusion find a natural representation in Polya Urns as they are able to capture dynamic increasing returns and history dependence. However, so far, the formulation has been mostly used to study the asymptotic properties of the process. Here, we demonstrated that Polya Urns can be fitted to the empirical data and that they may generate logistic curves of technology diffusion, thus producing trajectories generally observed in the adoptions of new technologies. As logistic processes are widespread in several domains of both social and natural sciences, this methodology will well find further applications to all those processes which entail self-reinforcing mechanisms of some kind.
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